Washington Can't Even Agree When Its War With Iran Started

Washington Can't Even Agree When Its War With Iran Started

The Trump administration's legal case for bombing Iran is already falling apart over a fundamental question: when did the fighting actually begin?

Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared last week that "the operation is over." Within hours, Trump contradicted him on social media, warning that if Iran rejected the U.S. peace plan, bombing would resume "at a much higher level and intensity." No new strikes have hit yet, but the contradiction laid bare a deeper problem plaguing the administration's position.

On February 28, Trump announced the assault with a straightforward rationale: the U.S. was acting to "eliminate imminent threats from the Iranian regime." That was the public justification. That was the legal justification Trump offered Americans for kinetic military action.

Then came April 21, when the State Department finally released its formal legal defense of Operation Epic Fury, nearly two months after the bombing began. What the document said exposed a problem the administration apparently couldn't ignore: the "imminent threat" argument didn't hold up.

So the State Department simply abandoned it. "The United States does not rely on a theory of imminence to justify its actions in this case," the legal assessment declared. Instead, officials now claim that February's massive bombing campaign was not a new war at all, but merely the latest chapter in a conflict with Iran that has been running for years.

This pivot created a new puzzle. If the war didn't start in February, when did it start?

The State Department's document proves remarkably evasive on this point. In different sections, it suggests the conflict began in 1979, when Iranian revolutionaries stormed the U.S. embassy and took American hostages. Elsewhere, it points to 2019, when Iran-backed militias fired rockets at U.S. bases in Iraq. Then it offers June 2025, claiming the U.S. and Israel eliminated Iran's nuclear capabilities at that moment, making that the true starting point of the broader war.

The third option creates a logical absurdity. If the war against Iran really began in June 2025, then what legal justification existed for that operation? The State Department never explains. Worse, pinning the war's start to June 2025 means backdating American military action by eight months, which defeats the purpose of claiming continuity with some pre-existing conflict.

The legal document appears less interested in answering actual critiques of the bombing campaign than in confirming them. By insisting that Operation Epic Fury represents just one battle in an ongoing, years-long war, the State Department effectively argues that the U.S. would have been justified in launching strikes against Iran at virtually any point in recent decades, including during Barack Obama's 2015 nuclear negotiations.

That reasoning obliterates any diplomatic foundation for ending the conflict. Peace requires both sides to believe that a settlement actually terminates hostilities. If the U.S. position is that war with Iran never really ended and could resume at any moment based on actions taken months or years earlier, no Iranian negotiator can reasonably sign on to a deal.

The State Department's logic is airtight but perverse: "If a conflict has not ended, then it must be ongoing." Under that standard, historical grievances and past military encounters become permanent justifications for future strikes. Trust collapses. Diplomacy becomes theater.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth previewed the administration's actual priority when he promised "maximum lethality, not tepid legality." The State Department's legal document confirms that the administration prioritizes military objectives over legal coherence. Tepid legality, of course, is simply another way of describing illegality.

Author James Rodriguez: "When an administration can't even agree on when its own war started, you know the legal justification was invented after the fact."

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