A firefighter in the truck that collided with an Air Canada jet at LaGuardia last month heard air traffic control warnings to stop but didn't initially realize the message was directed at his vehicle, federal investigators revealed Thursday in a preliminary crash report.
The National Transportation Safety Board said the fire truck's turret operator first heard a controller issue a general stop command without identifying who it was for. Only when the controller followed up with "Truck 1, stop, stop, stop" did the crew member understand the warning applied to them. By then, the vehicle was already positioned on the runway as Air Canada Express Flight 8646 descended toward landing on March 22.
The turret operator recalled seeing the airplane's lights on the runway as the fire truck turned left, investigators reported after interviewing the crew member. Seconds later, the CRJ900 regional jet from Montreal struck the vehicle, killing both pilots, Antoine Forest and Mackenzie Gunther.
The collision occurred just 12 seconds after an air traffic controller had cleared the fire truck to cross the runway. The plane carried more than 70 people and had about 40 on board taken to hospitals, along with the two firefighters in the truck. A flight attendant survived being ejected onto the tarmac while still strapped in her seat.
The fire truck was leading a six-vehicle convoy responding to an emergency aboard a United Airlines jet after crew members reported a strong cabin odor making flight attendants ill.
System Failures and Operational Strain
The NTSB's investigation uncovered multiple system failures that contributed to the disaster. LaGuardia has an advanced surface surveillance system designed to prevent runway incursions by displaying the location of all planes and vehicles to controllers in the tower. The system, called ASDE-X, failed to detect the collision risk because the fire truck was not equipped with a transponder. The system also couldn't generate an alert due to the presence of emergency vehicles behind the truck, and the proximity of the merging vehicles prevented the alarm from triggering.
The runway warning lights that are supposed to act as stop signals for crossing traffic remained illuminated until approximately three seconds before impact, the NTSB said.
LaGuardia's control tower was operating under unusual pressure that night. Flight delays had pushed the number of arrivals and departures after 10pm to more than double the scheduled volume. Planes were landing every few minutes, with a dozen flights arriving around 11pm, while controllers simultaneously managed the emergency response to the United Airlines odor incident.
The Air Canada flight received clearance to land on runway 4 at 11:35pm. About two minutes later, the fire crew requested permission to cross the same runway to reach the United jet that had parked between the fire station and where they needed to be. The controller cleared the truck to proceed just five seconds before the Air Canada plane was less than 100 feet above the ground.
The controller issued the frantic stop command nine seconds before the plane's landing gear touched down. The crash marked the first deadly incident at LaGuardia in 34 years.
Author James Rodriguez: "The controller did everything right at the end, but the system designed to prevent this exact scenario failed on multiple fronts, and a busy night with competing emergencies compressed the margins to zero."
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