George Robertson, the former NATO chief who authored the government's strategic defence review, has ignited a fierce debate about how much Britain should spend on its military. His warnings about the Prime Minister's "corrosive complacency" grabbed headlines, but they mask a deeper question: what is Britain's military actually for?
Robertson is pushing for billions in additional spending to close what he describes as a £28bn funding gap. The problem is his argument rests on an assumption that should itself be challenged: that Britain's current global military posture is the right one. If that strategy, built around worldwide deployment and alliance commitments, is fundamentally flawed, then the money shortage may signal overstretch rather than underfunding.
The backdrop is unsettling. Russia's war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and China's growing power make for a hazardous world. Yet Whitehall's own calculations suggest Britain faces no imminent serious threat to its homeland. The government has promised to raise defence spending, but most of the increases are pushed into the 2030s. Robertson's frustration is understandable: current military budget plans remain constrained and unresolved.
What Robertson is really defending is a model where Britain functions as America's junior partner. Rather than building toward strategic independence or deeper European ties, the vision is armed forces tailored to support the United States. Britain's purchase last year of 12 American F-35A jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons illustrates the point. The UK does not control the nuclear technology, only where the planes operate. It is about tighter integration with NATO's nuclear-sharing apparatus under American command.
This arrangement is not new. When Robertson produced the first modern strategic defence review in 1998 as Tony Blair's defence secretary, historians noted Britain was essentially committing itself to global policing operations alongside Washington. The armed forces themselves were structured not for independent national defence but to function as America's principal military partner. Only a fraction of spending, roughly 15 to 20 percent, was actually directed toward defending British territory.
The Treasury's skepticism about pouring more money into defence now has merit. Slashing welfare to fund military buildup would damage economic demand and growth. Defence spending also delivers weaker economic stimulus than public investment and performs poorly as a job creator. More troubling still, Britain is not using higher defence outlays to build independent military capacity but to reshape its armed forces around an American venture capital and technology model.
With Donald Trump now in office, his threats over Greenland and his casual indifference to international law have exposed the risks of betting Britain's security on American reliability. Before committing billions, the government must ask a harder question than Robertson is asking: whose security is actually being funded here?
Author James Rodriguez: "Robertson's calls for massive spending without questioning the strategy itself is backwards. Britain needs to decide what it's defending and for whom before writing the checks."
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