The Supreme Court has long lectured lower courts about staying out of election disputes once voting begins, yet critics say the justices have done precisely the opposite in recent redistricting rulings that benefit Republicans and reshape the electoral map heading into the 2026 midterms.
The catalyst was the court's Louisiana decision, released less than three weeks before that state's primary election, which weakened protections under the Voting Rights Act. The ruling unleashed a scramble in Republican-led states to redraw congressional districts, and it touched off a chain reaction: Louisiana and Alabama have both moved back their primary elections to implement new maps designed to eliminate Democratic-held majority-Black districts.
In Louisiana, ballots had already been cast when Governor Jeff Landry suspended House elections originally scheduled for May 16. Alabama pushed its affected primaries from May 19 to August. The court itself accelerated matters by granting expedited requests from both states, allowing them to proceed with favored maps that lower courts had blocked.
The timing and scope of the interventions stand in stark contrast to the court's established doctrine. The "Purcell principle," drawn from a 2006 Supreme Court decision, holds that judges should exercise restraint when elections loom because late rule changes breed voter confusion. The court's own unsigned opinion in that case stated: "As an election draws closer, that risk will increase."
Justice Brett Kavanaugh himself articulated the principle's logic in 2020, writing that "when an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled." Yet in both the Louisiana and Alabama decisions greenlighting the redistricting efforts, the court's majority offered no written reasoning and made no mention of Purcell.
Legal scholars and civil rights advocates have seized on the apparent contradiction. Kareem Crayton, a lawyer at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, called the moves "a raw exercise of power." He added: "The court is effectively, whether they are trying to or not, playing an outsized role in this midterm election."
The backlash arrives as the court battles a credibility crisis. Chief Justice John Roberts complained last week that the public wrongly sees the justices as "political actors," even as recent NBC polling shows confidence in the institution at historic lows. The court has drawn fire not only for these redistricting moves but also for its series of rulings favoring the Trump administration.
Conservative Justice Samuel Alito pushed back sharply in his defense of the Alabama decision, calling suggestions of abuse "groundless and irresponsible." Some legal experts offer a technical defense: Derek Muller, an election law professor at the University of Notre Dame, argues that Purcell may not apply when the Supreme Court is lifting a lower court's injunction rather than imposing new rules. The distinction, he suggested, gives the court room to argue it is acting consistently with established doctrine.
But other scholars note the court has applied Purcell inconsistently. Justin Levitt, an election law expert at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, pointed to the court's December decision allowing Texas to use a gerrymandered map that a lower court had blocked months before the primaries. Justice Elena Kagan dissented then, warning that if such timing passes muster, "every state has an opportunity to hold an unlawful election."
Levitt concluded that under the court's recent application, "Purcell seems like it's really not a principle at all. It seems the Supreme Court is picking winners and losers, not doing law."
The court's 6-3 conservative majority faces a widening perception that it manipulates timing and doctrine to advantage Republican interests, especially during critical election windows. Whether the justices intended to be perceived as kingmakers or simply believe their legal reasoning is sound, the outcome is the same: the appearance that the highest court in the land is working the refs rather than calling the game.
Author Sarah Mitchell: "The Purcell principle looks hollow when the Supreme Court applies it only when it suits a particular outcome."
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